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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR FIDUCIARY RULE – EXPANSION OF 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES  
Paul L. Vorndran† 
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has expanded the “investment 
advice fiduciary” definition under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974.1 On April 6, 2016, the DOL issued its final 
rule (Fiduciary Rule) imposing fiduciary duties upon those who 
provide investment advice for compensation—direct or indirect—as 
to the purchase or sale of securities or other investments within a 
plan or individual retirement account qualified under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. 2  According to the 
Executive Summary, the Fiduciary Rule “aims to require advisers 
and their firms to give advice that is in the best interest of their 
customers, without prohibiting common compensation 
arrangements under conditions designed to ensure the adviser is 
acting in accordance with fiduciary norms and basic standards of 
fair dealing.”3 Further, according to the Executive Summary, the 
DOL concluded (after a multi-year study that began in 2009) that 
IRA holders receiving conflicted investment advice may see their 
investments underperform by an average of 0.5 to 1% per year.4 
This could result in a cost to IRA investors between $95 billion and 
$189 billion over the next 10 years in the mutual fund segment 
alone.5  
Prior to the adoption of the Fiduciary Rule, many advisers of tax 
qualified accounts included insurance companies and their 
producers and broker-dealers and their sales representatives. These 
advisers of tax qualified accounts have not traditionally owed 
fiduciary duties to those they advise or to those they sell securities 
and investments. Before the Fiduciary Rule, only registered 
investment advisers acting pursuant to the Investment Advisors Act 
of 1940 and registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission or licensed with state securities commissions owed 
fiduciary duties to their customers as a matter of law.6 Upon the 
effective date of the Fiduciary Rule, April 10, 2017, broker-dealers 
and insurance companies will owe fiduciary duties to their 
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customers in connection with the sale of investment products in tax 
qualified accounts. 
The DOL’s adoption of the Fiduciary Rule was unquestionably 
controversial. During the comment period following the DOL’s 
release of the proposed Fiduciary Rule in early 2015, Commissioner 
Daniel M. Gallagher of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission issued a scathing comment letter to DOL Secretary 
Thomas E. Perez.7 Commissioner Gallagher predicted that broker-
dealers utilizing a commission-based fee structure would find it so 
difficult to comply with the “labyrinth of prohibitions and 
exemptions” of the Fiduciary Rule that they would no longer 
continue to service lower-valued accounts. 8  According to 
Commissioner Gallagher, this is bad government policy, will 
affirmatively harm those it claims to help, and proves the “nanny-
state is alive and well.”9 
Now that the fiduciary standards will apply to all types of advisers 
when providing recommendations concerning tax qualified 
accounts, current methods of compensation for insurance producers 
and broker-dealers will be prohibited if they are not in the best 
interest of the investor. Generally, fiduciaries are prohibited from 
receiving compensation from third parties in connection with 
transactions involving the plans and IRAs.10 For example, the sale 
of variable annuities and indexed annuities into a qualified account 
would not be permitted as these types of investments provide the 
seller with compensation from the insurance company.11 However, 
the Fiduciary Rule provides an exemption to conflicting payment 
structures or “prohibited transactions” that allows the fiduciary to 
continue to provide advice and make otherwise prohibited sales. The 
exemption is known as the Best Interest Contract Exemption 
(BICE). 
In order to satisfy BICE, the fiduciary must agree to provide 
investment advice that is in the best interest of the investor, 
acknowledge its fiduciary status, receive only reasonable 
compensation, disclose all potential conflicts of interest, and provide 
a detailed breakdown of his collected commission.12 As reflected in 
many commentaries, the meaning of these requirements for the 
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exemption, and what constitutes actual compliance, is not altogether 
clear. 
The additional compliance obligations will certainly come at a cost. 
Some fiduciaries may elect to eliminate small investors as the cost 
to comply might be too great as suggested by Commissioner 
Gallagher. It remains to be seen what fallout the Fiduciary Rule will 
have on both the industry and investors. What is clear is that 
investment professionals and their lawyers and advisers will spend 
substantial time and money sorting out this new overlay of law 
governing retirement plans and IRAs. 
